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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-BAR TO SUIT BEFORE
TORT OCCURS
A Connecticut statute' provides that no action for personal injury shall
be brought after one year from date of act or omission complained of.
In a suit for personal injury due to negligence in the manufacture of a
rifle, defendant pleaded that the action accrued at the time of the manu-
facture and the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff
asserted that the action accrued at the time of the harm. Held, "Act or
omission" applied to the original defective manufacture and operated to bar
any action subsequent to one year after the date of the manufacture, re-
gardless of the time when the injury occurred. Dincher v. Martin Firearms
Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1951).
There is no fixed rule as to when a cause of action accrues. The statute
in each case must be considered2 and the courts must look to the language
of the statute to determine its meaning. 3 Some states hold that limitation
statutes should be interpreted very liberally4 while others maintain they
should be strictly construed.5 In construing the language of statutes appar-
ently unambiguous, the courts have tended to avoid a literal interpreta-
tion where they believed that it would yield an inequitable result." Gen-
erally, the test of when the statutory period begins to run is either when the
defendant commits his wrong7 or, when substantial harm matures.8 If de-
fendant's original conduct invades the plaintiff's rights, so that the suit
could be maintained regardless of actual damage (as in the case of trespass),
the statute commences upon the completion of the conduct. But if harm
is deemed the gist of the action, the occurrence of the actual harm marks
the beginning of the period. 9
In at least one state it has been held that the limitation runs from the
time of the negligent conduct, despite recognition of the fact that not even
nominal damages are recoverable prior to the time harm is suffered. Thus,
if the interval prior to the maturation of the harm exceeded the statutory
period the cause of the action was barred) 0 The effect of this rule has fre-
quently been to bar the plaintiff's action not only before he sustained any
1. CONN. REv. G.N. STAT. § 8324 (Supp. 1949).
2. Peninslvania Coal & Coke Corp. v. U.S., 70 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Holton
v. US., 65 F. Supp. 903 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
3. Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938).
4. Erskine v. Dykes. 158 Kan. 788, 150 P.2d 322 (1944).
5. Newby's Adm'r. v. Warren's AdM'r., 277 Ky. 338, 126 S.W.2d 436 (1939).
6. 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177 (1950).
7. E.g., looper v. Carver Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939).
8. E.g., Theurer v. Condon, 209 P.2d 311 (Wash. 1949); White v. Schnoebclen,
91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941).
9. See note 6 supra. See PaossER, ToRrs § 30 (1941). But see MCCoR7ncI,
DAMAGES § 89 (1935).
10. E.g., Theurer v. Condon, 209 P.2d 311 (Wash. 1949) (period measured from
time of fire, rather than from time of negligent installation of fuel tank).
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perceptible harm, but before it was feasible for him to learn that the negli-
gence had taken place."
The contrary view is that no statute of limitation will run against a
person until he is allowed by law to do the things to which the statute is
directed. 12 A cause or right of action accrues, so as to start the statute run-
ning, when the right to institute and maintain a suit arises, and not be-
fore.13 The accrual has been said to depend on the uniting of at least two
elements-in jury and damages. 14
In the instant case the court construed the language of the statute5
very strictly. The court felt the intention of the legislature was clearly
manifested by the change of the language "injury or neglect" in a prior
statute to "act or omission" in the revised statute. The dissenting opinion
expresses the belief that it is a legal "axiom" that a statute of limitation does
not begin to run before a cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial rem-
edy is available to the plaintiff.' 7 Furthermore, it is asserted that the phrase
"act or omission" is a synonym for "injury or neglect"; that the reason for
the change of language in the revised statute was merely for uniformity of
language between the various tort statutes; and therefore, the change was
not significant.
It is a convenient rule that knowledge of a wrong is immaterial in most
cases involving statutes of limitation where some harm would be apparent
to one using ordinary care, Where the neglect is indeterminable before
the injury (and surely in this case it was so) the inequities of depriving the
plaintiff of an effective remedy should prevent a decision such as this.',
Theoretically, an interpretation as in the instant case could open the door
to fnud. A manufacturer or his retail outlet would only have to store any
article for one year before sale to be completely absolved of liability. Surely
this could not be the intent of the legislature.19 The policy behind a limi-
tations statute is to prevent one who "sleeps upon his rights" from bringing
an action.20 There can be no reason for penalizing one who "sleeps on a
11. Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771 (1948);
cf. Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940). Contra: White v. Schnoe-
belen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941) (period commences when lightning causes dain-
age, not when lightning rod negligently installed). But see Quinn v. Press, 135 Tex. 60,
140 S.W.2d 438 (1940).
12. Moore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Miss. 420, 156 So. 875, aff'd, 158 So.
148 (1934); cf. Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452. 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936).
13. Eising v. Andrews, 66 Conn. 58, 33 Atl. 585 (1895); accord, Schemp v.
Beardsley, 83 Conn. 34, 75 Atl. 141 (1910).
14. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1938).
15. CONN. REV. CEN. STAT. § 8324 (Supp. 1949).
16. CoNN. REV. CEN. STAT. § 6015 (Supp. 1930) ("from the date of the injury
or neglect complained of"). CONN. REV, CEN. STAT. § 8324 (Supp. 1949) ("from the
date of the act or omission complained of").
17. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1951).
18. E.g., Aachen & Munich Fire Ins, Co. v. Morton, 156 Fed, 654 (6th Cir. 1907)
semble (breach of contract).
19. 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
20. Consolidated Motor Lines, Inc. v. M. & M. Transportation Co., 128 Conn. 107,
20 A.Zd 621 (1941).
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right" he does not have, but this is the result of the decision in the instant
case.
Lawrence 1. Hollander
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-DISABILITIES AS TOLLING
LIMITATION PERIOD
A city ordinance provides that "no suit shall be maintained against
the city ... for any tort unless ... written notice of such damage was, within
thirty (30) days after receiving of the injury alleged given to the city
attorney . . ."' In suit for personal injury caused by the negligence of a city
employee, the city pleaded notice had not been given within the time
allowed. Plaintiff requested permission to show that she was unconscious
as a result of her injury for the full thirty day period, and could not
fulfill the requirement as to notice. Held, one rcndered unconscious by an
act charged to have resulted from the negligence of the city, and who
remains unconscious as a result of that act for the full period allowed for
the giving of notice will not be precluded from recovery because of failure
to comply with the statute. City of Miami Beach v. Alexander, 61 So. 2nd
917 (1952).
In many instances limitation statutes contain saving clauses or excep-
tions in favor of persons under physical or mental disability which toll the
statute until the disability is removed.2  In recent years the courts have
loathed to interpose exceptions not expressly made by the legislature,3
however reasonable or equitable such exceptions may seem. 4 The courts
feel that such conduct would invade and obstruct the function and purpose
of the legislative branch of government." The result of this attitude is to
bar a pcrson from maintaining an action if he fails to give notice within
the prescribed period regardless of his disability.0
1. Miami Beach Code § 45 (1950).
2. Nesbit v. Topeka, 87 Kan. 394, 124 Pac. 166 (1912); Stoliker v. Boston, 204
Mass. 522, 90 N.E. 927 (1910); Ray v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 340, 46 N.W. 675 (1890);
Kunkel v St. Louis, 163 S.WV.2d 1016 (Mo. 1942): Randolph v. City of Springfield,
302 Mo. 33, 257 S.W. 449 (1923); Cbouteau v. loss, 118 Okla. 76, 246 Pac. 844
(1926); Gonyeau v. Milton, 48 Vt. 172 (1876); Born v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 719,
68 Pac. 386 (1902).
3. Barret v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30 So. 36 (1901); Williams v. Jacksonville,
118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Buss v. Kemp Lumber Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54
(1918); Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 Vyo. 108. 42 P.2d 54 (1935).
4. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla.
671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Butler v. Craig, 27 Miss. 628 (1854); Buss v. Kemp Lumber
Co., 23 N.M. 567, 170 Pac. 54 (1918).
5. Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla. 671, 160 So. 15 (1935); Federal Crude Oil
Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 73 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 741 (1935); Pietsch v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, 101 N.W. 388 (1904).
6, Johnson v. Fresno County, 64 Cal. App.2d 576, 149 P.2d 38 (1944): Reid v.
Kansas City, 195 Mo. App. 457, 192 S.W. 1047 (1917); Haynes v. Seattle, 83 Wash. 51,
145 Pao. 73 (1914); Ransom v. South Bend, 76 Wash. 396, 136 Pac. 365 (1913).
